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FROM HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS
TO EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS
1. Introduction
Agent heterogeneity is obvious if one consider the results of the large number of studies using
survey data. The use of such data is very appealing since it allows us to measure exchange rate
expectations directly. Using the panel data of biweekly surveys on the yen – dollar exchange rate
expectations of forty-four Japanese institutions from May 1985 to June 1987, Ito (1990) finds a
wide dispersion in individual expectations. In the three-month horizon, he observes that one
extreme predicted a 3.25 percent depreciation of the yen, while the other extreme predicted a
4.76 percent of appreciation. Mac Donald (1992), who compares the exchange expectations in
the G7 countries from October 1989 to March 1991, confirms this result. Frankel and Froot
(1986, 1987) also show that the standard deviations of the expectations mean increase
considerably when the horizon decreases. Ito (1990) and Takagi (1991) find significant individual
effects in participants’ expectation formation. Those individual effects have characteristics of
wishful expectations: exporters expect yen depreciation and importers expect a yen appreciation.
On the whole, survey data show that for short-term predictions, i.e. from one week to one
month, respondents tend to forecast by extrapolating recent trends (extrapolative expectations),
while for the long term, i.e. six to twelve months, they tend to forecast a return to long-run
equilibrium such as PPP (regressive expectations).
This durable combination of short-term extrapolative expectations, with destabilizing effects, and
long term regressive ones, which therefore stabilize, highlights two conflicting ideas of the
exchange dealers. Long term responses seem to express the operators’ economic reason, the
fundamentals, with respectability concern or simply a reproduction of what economic analysis
predicts about the foreign exchange rational expectations. On the other hand, short-term
responses seem to correspond to the market logic and reveal the true opinion, at a given time, of
the respondent. The observation of past trends, the use of chartist methods and the goal of being
in the market, thus neglecting the long term, seem to prevail. Interestingly, it is especially in the
short run that specialists’ trading takes place. The tremendous volume of FX trading is another
piece of evidence that reinforces the idea of heterogeneous expectations since it takes differences3
among market participants to explain why they trade
1. Goldstein et al. (1993) estimate that each
customer’s transaction generates, on average, four to five inter-dealer transactions in response to
the price discovery operations they imply and that the speculative operators adopt.
Standard models of exchange rate determination, in contrast, assume the existence of identical
investors who share rational expectations of future exchange rates, and who instantaneously and
rationally discount all market information concerning this rate. If this assumption is crucial
because it permits a simple aggregation of common individual behaviors, it is not ideally suited
because it raises the question of the existence of transactions if all agents are strictly identical
(Arrow, 1985). It follows that trading volume is low or zero, and that trading volume and price
volatility are not serially correlated in any way. However, foreign exchange markets, as well as
other financial markets, are characterized by a number of striking ubiquitous time-series features:
unit roots in level together with fat tails in returns and volatility clustering. As a result, studies
have been searching for alternative explanations of such realities.
Microstructure analyses investigate the role of the market’s organizational or institutional
characteristics on exchange rate determination: auction types, centralization of order flows,
quotation rules, etc. They see trading as a process of information transmission and market
opinion discovery (Lyons, 1995). Exchange rate determination is therefore endogenous to the
inter-bank market (Varian, 1989; Peraudin and Vitale, 1996). To date, these studies have not
answered the question of foreign exchange rate determination but have focused on the spread
determination, the relation between trading volume and volatility, the marketplace transmission
of volatility (Lyons, 1995; Flood, 1991 and 1994; Goodhart and Payne, 1996; Goodhart and al.,
1996; Goodhart and al., 1997; Evans and Lyons, 1999; Osler, 2001). They all emphasize the role
of traders as market-makers.
This paper relies on the growing literature on computational agent-based models. In his recent
survey, Le Baron (2000) argued that computational agent-based models stress interactions, and
the learning dynamics of groups of traders learning about the relations between prices and market
information. Under heterogeneity, expectations have a recursive character: agents have to form
their expectations from their anticipations of other agents’ expectations, and this self-reference
precludes expectations being formed by deductive means. Agents therefore continually form
                                                          
1 The banks in the BIS (1998) census reported that 81 percents of the spot trading, which represents a daily average
of $ 1,5 trillions, takes place among the banks and other financial institutions, rather than with customers such as
exporters and importers.4
individual, hypothetical, expectational models, test these, and trade on the ones that predict best.
Prices are driven endogenously by these induced expectations. Agents’ expectations co-evolve in
a world they co-create (Arthur et al., 1997). Arifovic (1996) considers a dynamic version of the
Kareken and Wallace (1981) model of exchange rate formation in a two country overlapping
generations world. Using a standard genetic algorithm procedure to update agents’ decision rules,
the simulations give exchange rate series which do not settle to any equilibrium. As it is outlined
in Le Baron (2000), this result is related to the structure of the indeterminacy of the model.
Arifovic and Gencay (2000) find that the model’s equilibrium dynamic is not constant but
exhibits bounded oscillations. Their time series analysis of the data indicates that the dynamics of
exchange rate returns is chaotic. Lux and Schornstein (2002), using the same model, find that for
particular parameterizations, the characteristics of exchange rate dynamics are very similar to
those of empirical data (i.e. unit root in levels together with fat tails in returns and volatility
clustering)
2. However, they show that whether or not realistic time series characteristics appear
essentially depends on the mutation probability and the number of agents. This later finding casts
doubts on the potential applicability of this model to real markets such as the foreign exchange
market.
Our artificial market is initially inspired by the Santa Fe Stock Market which is outlined in detail
in Arthur et al. (1997) and LeBaron et al. (1999), and is an extension of Neuberg and Bertels
(2003) model. However, it differs from it in some points. First, instead of a stock market we
simulate the USD/EUR exchange rate dynamic. Therefore, agent types are quite different.
Secondly, as our goal is to reproduce actual exchange rate series we use real data to create agents’
decision rules.
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps: section 2 will describe the market. We will explain
the different financial agents and their behaviors, then, the learning process and expectation
formation, market clearing and price formation, and finally the information set. Section 3 will
present the simulation results of the exchange rate dynamic and the statistical properties of the
simulated series.
                                                          
2 Similar results for other markets are found by Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Chen et al. (2001) Kirman and
Teyssiere (2001) among others.5
2. Description of the market
2.1.The financial agents
We distinguish between different kinds of traders on the market, each having his own rationality
and knowledge. Like any trader, the agent must be able to evaluate an action and form an
expectation with respect to its future price. In this paper, we will introduce four different types of
behavior which are described below.
  Fundamentalists: they forecast a return to a long-run equilibrium and therefore have
regressive expectations. They place buy (sell) orders if the current exchange rate is under
(over) this fundamental value. In this paper, the fundamental value is determined according
to uncovered interest rate parity.
  Noise traders: generally speaking, noise traders base their position on feelings not justified by
existing information. De Long et al. (1990a) and Shleifer and Summers (1990) consider pure
noise traders who act randomly. We will not take into account this kind of trader because the
foreign exchange market is a specialist one. Nevertheless, we will introduce two kinds of
noise traders traditionally described in literature (Cutler et al., 1990; De Long et al., 1990b).
Positive feedback traders are those who buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. Many
forms of common behavior in financial markets can be described as positive feedback
trading. It can result from extrapolative expectations about prices or trend chasing. It can also
result from stop-loss orders, which effectively prompt selling in response to price declines. A
similar form of positive feedback trading is the liquidation of the positions of investors
unable to meet margin calls. Negative feedback traders react negatively to previous price
movements: they buy when prices fall and sell when prices rise.
  News traders: they act in response to exogenous information which can be decomposed into
three types: good news, bad news and no news. Like noise traders we distinguish between
positive news traders and negative ones. The former react positively to the news, e.g. they
buy when the news is good and sell otherwise. The latter react negatively, e.g. they sell when
the news is good and buy otherwise.
  Naive traders: they expect the exchange rate to remain stable (Arthus, 1992).6
We will only consider pure behavior without re-learning agents.
2.2. The learning process of agents and expectation formation
Different methods allow us to build agent behavior models without using formalization based on
explicit equations. This is the case of genetic algorithms (GA), a method initially developed by
Holland (1975) to study the adaptive system. They are now applied to the study of learning
systems. The purpose is to explain and model the natural adaptive learning process in order to
build artificial systems using the natural mechanisms of the learning process. The simplicity of
use of genetic algorithms explains their success. GAs allow us to simulate inductive agents
learning in a dynamic environment. It is a way of simulating natural learning with a learning of
rules and a model of decision making. These rules are built and corrected with the information
that the agents have on the environment. The learning process allows the agents to form
hypotheses and to formulate expectations about the market. This learning is modeled by a
classifier system.
In our model, each agent needs to be able to decide whether he wants to buy or sell a particular
currency and at what price. He therefore needs to have decision rules that allow him to formulate
some kind of expectation as to the future evolution of the exchange rate. He will do so on the
basis of information at his disposal. In our model we have chosen to implement a classifier
system where different decision rules are represented as if-then rules. At a given moment, if a
condition of his set satisfies the present situation in the environment, the agent will take the
corresponding action. The condition of each rule is a chain of characters (“0”, “1” or “#”)
determining whether the rule is equivalent to the market situation. This equivalence is achieved if
the characters along the chain of the condition are similar to the characters along the chain of the
market situation. In the case of character “#”, there is always an equivalence to the extent that it
expresses the indifference between the characters “1” and “0”. As for the action, it is a chain of
characters representing the value of two parameters a and b in binary fashion. These parameters
allow us to compute the expected future exchange rate in the following way:
[]()b e a e E t t + = +1 [1]
where et is the exchange rate at time t. For each agent, a set of rules allowing the calculation of
these expected prices will be generated using genetic algorithms. Initially 2000 rules are generated
and during the learning process, depending on the agent’s type, this number will be reduced. In7
contrast to previous studies, the learning process is based on real data. Risk aversion is expressed
in terms of the CARA utility function which, for the sake of comparability, is taken from [1].
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where w represents the wealth of the trader and λ  indicates the degree of risk aversion.
In this original set of 2000 rules, some may be more efficient than others. Those rules yielding
more accurate expected prices and therefore a higher financial gain will have a higher
reproduction rate and a higher probability of survival. Before starting trading simulations, each
agent learns the market dynamic passively. This means that he will use real market data to
construct his set of rules. The effectiveness of the decision rules is defined in relation to the error
generated by the rule and is computed as follows:
() [] ()
2
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using [1] results in
()( ) ()
2
1 + − + = t t e b e a rule Error [4]
A perfect rule will compute an expected value equal to the exchange rate and the error will be
null. This kind of rule will have a maximum evaluation value. If we represent this maximum value
by C, we obtain a rule evaluation function, also called the strength of the rule, which is defined as
follows:
() ( ) ()
2
1 + − + − = t t e b e a C rule Eval [5]
A process that will assume agents’ rationality completes this evaluation function. Each rule must
reflect the specific agent type. Let us take an example: the rule of a fundamentalist agent will
receive a better evaluation function if this rule leads to a value of exchange rate that is based on
interest rate parity. Otherwise, this rule will be under-evaluated, even if the predicted value is not
so bad.8
2.3. Market clearing and price formation
Intersecting orders to buy and sell create the dynamics of exchange rates. The market clearing
mechanism is similar to that of the Santa Fe Stock Market in which bids are continuously
resubmitted until a price (an exchange rate in our case) is formed that clears the market. For each
period of time, the agents try to optimize the allocation of risky and non-risky assets, i.e. US
currency versus Euro currency. Initially, the exchange rate previsions made by agent i at time t are
normally distributed with an average of  ] [ 1 , + t t i e E  and a variance 
2
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where  t r is the interest rate of the non-risky asset at time t.
As the market is composed of n agents, we therefore have n equations with n+1 unknown values:
the n quantities of risky assets allocated by agents ( t i x , ) and the exchange rate at time t. In order
to close the system, we add an equation which means that total demand is equal to the number of
available goods on the market: n x
n
i
t i = ∑
=1
, . At each time t, the exchange rate  t e can be computed
by resolving the (n+1)*(n+1) system of equations.
2.4. Information set
In our model, information arrives at the market at regular intervals of time. Every iteration
represents one day. The information is used differently depending on the agent type. As we
previously defined agents, they will use part of the available information. Information is
composed of three different parts: technical information, fundamental information and
exogenous information.
The technical part is provided by a two bit binary chain. The first character of the chain concerns
the trends of the exchange rate. If the return of the exchange rate on the previous period is
positive, then the value will be “1”, otherwise it will be “0”. The second character reflects the
absolute value of the trends. If the absolute value of the return is greater than 5 percent, then the
value is “1”, if the absolute value is lower or equal to 5 percent, then it is “0”.9
The fundamental part of the information represents interest rate parity. The first character is
constructed with a 3 month interest rate and a 3 month forward exchange rate. If the value of the
forward exchange rate is lower than the computed exchange rate, the value of the character will
be “1”, “0” otherwise. The same reasoning is used at a 6 month horizon.
The third part of information is related to exogenous information. This information may vary
from negative (-1) over neutral () to positive (1). We filtered important events influencing the
trends of the market. This kind of information would be for instance a terrorist event as well as
an intervention of a Central Bank on interest rates.
3. Simulation results
It is important to emphasize that we are focusing on understanding the dynamics of the exchange
market and not on prediction. This model is validated as regards this objective if statistical
properties can be compared to the real exchange rate values. The framework of simulations is to
find the best ratio between the number of different agent’ types in order to imitate the real
market.
3.1. Presentation of simulations
We started our investigation by the creation of an individual agent’ model. As previously
mentioned, we used real data concerning the EUR/USD exchange rate from January 1999. On a
daily basis, 700 periods of time are considered for the learning process (until June 2001). Five
different agents were created for each type. During this learning process, no market simulations
were performed. Agents were just learnt by trading like passive actors on the market. After this
first step, simulations were performed from January 1999 to May 2004. During this period agents
traded actively on the artificial market. This means that half the period of simulations is outside
periods concerned by the learning process. Thereby, over-learning leading to a pure restitution is
avoided, at least during the second part of the simulation period.
We will present only the five most representative simulations leading to the most reliable
exchange rate dynamic.10
Simulation 1: We started our investigation with only a pure fundamentalists’ market. We therefore
performed simulations including three fundamentalists and no other agents. As can be seen in
Graph 1, the simulated series exhibited a long-run equilibrium with a very low volatility compared
to the actual exchange rate. Interestingly, over the last 12 months the two series seemed to
converge which may indicate that the market was driven by fundamentalists’ beliefs.
Simulation 2: A purely technical market excluding fundamentalist was then explored. 2 positive
feedback traders and 2 negative feedback traders were present in this market. We can observe in
this simulation a global shape closer to reality that the previous one. Nevertheless, the main
characteristics of this market were two trends: one upward, one downward. The volatility was too
low to be compared to reality. One conclusion can be that the global shape of the real exchange
market is driven by technical forces. Unfortunately, nothing could explain the change of trends if
we just consider technical traders. In this simulation, this could be due to the fact that technical
agents, during learning, had also constructed a small number of fundamental rules.
Simulation 3: A market with 2 positive feedback traders, 2 negative feedback traders and 4
fundamentalist agents seems to give more volatility and a more accurate dynamic. In that market,
we can observe both the same global shape as reality, and more frequent dynamic patterns
resembling the real world.
Graph1: Results of simulations 1 to 311
Simulation 4: We then simulated a market incorporating every type of agent. 2 positive feedback
traders, 2 negative feedback traders, 2 fundamentalists, 2 news agents, 2 negative news agents as
well as 2 naïf agents traded in this market. We observed two main parts in the simulation. The
first one is a quite linear increase of the market and the second part is a dynamic that is closer to
reality. This ratio of agent types is more appropriate during a bear market that in a bull market.
Therefore, we have to find a better ratio that could explain every kind of dynamic.
Simulation 5: The most appropriate ratio of agent types that we could find is 3 positive feedback
traders, 1 negative feedback trader, 5 fundamentalists, 2 positive news agents, 1 negative news
and 1 naïve agent. In that case, the model seemed to better reproduce the real market.
Graph 2: Results of Simulations 4 to 5
3.2. Statistical properties
To see whether our simulated series had realistic times series properties, we used a series of
statistical tests. All the results are detailed in appendix. First, we calculated the first four moments
of the exchange rate returns’ distribution and tested for normality (table 1). Secondly, we
analyzed the auto-correlation of returns (table 2). Thirdly, since previous studies had shown that
(log) exchange rates series are non stationary processes, we performed typical tests (Phillips &
Perron  and KPSS test with constant and trends) for the presence of a unit root in our series12
(table 3). Finally, we computed the BDS tests to test the null hypothesis of iid returns and
estimate the entropy (table 4).
As expected, the Bera-Jarque test for normality led to a strong rejection of the null hypothesis for
all series. We observed significant excess kurtosis in real and simulated return series, which
confirms the existence of fat tails. There is no asymmetry in the real series and the fifth simulated
series, which we consider to be the most representative. However, the variance of the simulated
series are smaller than the real data. Concerning the Ljung-Box statistic, we concluded that there
was a highly significant auto-correlation in level, squared and absolute values in all simulated
series but not in the real exchange rates. The numerical precision used in the code of market
models is such that the returns produced have a quite limited number of significant decimals. As
a consequence, there is a limited number of different figures and therefore a higher auto-
correlation of these series. Perhaps, another explication may be the codification of exogenous
information in our market (“-1”, “0”, “+1”).
As expected, unit root tests could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the exchange
rates nor in the simulated series, with the exception of simulation 1. The different series were
non-stationary processes.
In addition, we calculated the BDS statistic of Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman. The BDS
statistic tests the null hypothesis of identical and independent distribution and it is shown to be
powerful against nonlinear alternatives. It is distributed asymptotically standard normal. For
certain cases (especially when σ/ε  is large) we rejected the null hypothesis that the series was iid,
i.e. that the series was chaotic. We computed the entropy which is the sum of the positive
Lyapunov exponents. It provided a quantitative measure of the non-predictability of the chaotic
system. All values were positive. We then concluded that the predictability of the series was low.
In other words, the lower the entropy is, the higher is the potentiality of predictability, even if the
system remains non-predictable in the long-run. In our case, we concluded that the exchange rate
is more predictable in the short term but is difficult to predict in the long term.13
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyze how heterogeneous behaviors of agents influence the
exchange rate dynamic in the short and long term. We examined how agents use the information
and what kind of information they use, in order to make their decisions and form an expectation
of the exchange rate. We investigated a methodology based on interactive agent simulations to
reproduce the exchange rate dynamic of the EUR/USD exchange rate. To reproduce stylized
facts of the exchange rate dynamic, we conclude that the key factor is the correct proportion of
each agent type, without any need for mimetic behavior, adaptive agents or pure noisy agents.
The next step would be to incorporate more agents of each type in order to refine the best ratio
of agent types. We can easily plan to multiply the number of agents by ten and therefore total one
hundred. We could also increase the amount of data. Another point to improve is the quality of
treatment of the exogenous information.
One interesting point to research would be to follow the study in terms of the portfolio value of
agents, i.e. the wealth evolution of each agent, as well as a dynamic evolution of their risk
aversion corresponding to their loss or gain.
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Appendix
Table 1: Sample statistics of returns
Real Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4 Sim. 5
Mean 1.28e-3 -3.32e-3 -1.41e-3 -1.17e-3 -2.56e-3 -1.19e-3




















** indicates statistical significance at the conventional 1 % and 5 % levels.
Table 2: Autocorrelations of returns



























































** indicates statistical significance at the conventional of the Ljung-Box statistic 1 % and 5
% levels.
Table 3: Unit root tests of (log) foreign exchange rates
Real Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4 Sim. 5
t(ρ -1)/τ -2.11 -3.96
* -1.17 -1.55 -1.09 -1.59
ξ µ(1) 23.41 32.61 18.58 21.29 20.49 24.02
ξ τ (1) 16.33 15.19 17.19 16.87 17.30 16.70
t(ρ -1)/τ  is the Phillips-Perron test for unit root with constant and trend. The critical value are -3.96, -3.31 and –3.12
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. ξ µ(1) and ξ τ (1) are the KPSS tests for unit root for lag l = 1 with constant
and trend respectively. The critical values are 0.739, 0.463 and 0.347 and 0.216, 0.143 and 0.119 respectively at the
1%, 5% and 10 % level.18
Table 4: BDS tests for the foreign exchange returns and entropy
σ /ε  = 0.5 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9 m=10
Real Serie -0.22 -0.19 -0.17 -0.02 0.26 0.29 0.84 1.16 1.62
Simulation 1 4.40 5.05 5.91 6.94 8.37 10.22 12.92 16.14 19.38
Simulation 2 1.74 1.82 2.05 2.34 2.61 2.89 3.23 3.61 3.88
Simulation 3 3.47 5.77 7.83 10.15 13.42 17.76 23.60 32.22 42.63
Simulation 4 5.39 6.60 8.49 10.82 13.79 17.88 23.07 30.57 40.96
Simulation 5 8.28 13.49 21.42 34.86 58.23 101.35 181.10 328.99 601.26
σ /ε  = 1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9 m=10
Real Serie -0.13 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.26 0.44 0.68 0.88
Simulation 1 3.20 3.30 3.63 4.01 4.61 5.35 6.35 7.44 8.46
Simulation 2 1.15 1.18 1.29 1.46 1.63 1.80 2.00 2.20 2.35
Simulation 3 -1.41 -0.21 0.26 0.53 0.79 1.03 1.20 1.49 1.71
Simulation 4 3.85 4.74 6.02 7.50 9.15 11.13 13.48 16.89 21.18
Simulation 5 4.33 6.84 9.75 13.83 19.60 27.98 40.45 59.76 88.68
σ /ε  = 1.5 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9 m=10
Real Serie -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.43
Simulation 1 -0.46 -0.47 -0.40 -0.37 -0.33 -0.28 -0.23 -0.15 -0.06
Simulation 2 -0.23 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.17
Simulation 3 -0.96 -0.49 -0.38 -0.29 -0.23 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 0.00
Simulation 4 10.33 10.92 12.87 15.20 18.20 21.81 26.27 31.96 39.02
Simulation 5 3.21 4.67 6.02 7.63 9.55 11.92 14.93 19.00 24.15
σ /ε  = 2 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9 m=10
Real Serie -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.23
Simulation 1 -0.55 -0.56 -0.47 -0.44 -0.41 -0.36 -0.32 -0.25 -0.17
Simulation 2 -0.37 -0.31 -0.26 -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.32
Simulation 3 -0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
Simulation 4 0.43 0.54 0.73 0.92 1.08 1.23 1.37 1.52 1.66








σ  is the standard deviation of the exchange rates, m refers to the embedding dimension, ε  is the distance parameter
and is chosen to be the fraction of the standard deviation of the data. BDS test is distributed standard normal
asymptotically. The entropy is the sum of the positive lyapunov exponents and is computed for m = 5.